

# Turnitin Popular Islam

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## POPULAR ISLAM: A CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENON IN INDONESIA

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### ABSTRACT

Artikel ini menegaskan Islam populer merupakan fenomena keislaman yang sedang bangkit di Indonesia. Islam Populer lahir karena faktor pemahaman keislaman yang bersifat simbolik. Keislaman semacam ini mengarah pada formalisme Islam, ketimbang substansial yang mengarah pada kemanusiaan dan keadilan. Islam populer banyak dipengaruhi pula karena hadirnya ustadz-ustadzah selebriti dan kampanye besar-besaran dari media social seperti *Instagram*, *facebook*, *linkedin*, serta *whatshap*. Tantangan terbesar Islam Indonesia, selain bangkitnya Islam populer adalah tumbuhnya semangat keislaman yang bersifat penggunaan identitas dalam politik sehingga membangkitkan adanya keislaman yang bersifat radikal-ekstremisme. Islam radikalisme-ekstremisme sebenarnya bukan kultur Islam Indonesia, namun belakangan berkembang di Indonesia.

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### INTRODUCTION

Islam is a universal religion. Islam is not only related to Allah, but also to human being. Muslim translates the above terms from the arabic terms *hablum min Allah and hablum min an nas*. Islam is then teaching about rituals in everyday life, like prayer before eating and drinking. Muslim communities commonly relate their every day activities to Allah and Muhammad. But, in Muslim communities there are some activities related to only for artificial piety, such as buying the expensive mukena (hijab) and performing the Hajj and Umrah every year added with the expensive travelling programs to Israel, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Turkiye.

Therefore, the issue of Islam and popular culture is very popular in Muslim communities. Many cultures that are not part of the ritual are considered rituals. While there are also parts of the ritual that are considered as habits. Islam eventually experienced a reduction in daily practices due to understanding of the Qur'an and hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. This is also stated by Talal Asad who points out that almost nothing is fictional in Islam except the Holy Qur'anic text. In addition, it can be debated which results in differences of understanding (Asad 1986, 11) .

The emergence of two dimensions in Islamic practice, between the dimensions of ritual and poppluar culture can actually be seen as part of a "drama of religiosity". This has the power so that religious practices in Islam, if not discussed properly there will be "opposition" between culture and religious rituals. Therefore, we need a cultural mediation and islamic understanding that is more transformative and progressive. Here actually the matter of culture that influences and is influenced not always comes from the west or Europe,

but it can also come from within our own country even from the local level.

The battle between culture and ritual in Islam as stated by Mahmood (2005) is a "social construction of Muslim piety" in which cannot be separated from issues of economic power, politics and religious negotiations that are very important. It is related to how a Muslim applies the dimension of piety well, but also be able to live in the modern world and even post modernism condition. Therefore a cross cultural orientation in Muslim communities is something that needs to be considered in the study of Religiosity and Culture as part of a serious problem in contemporary religious and cultural studies (Eickelman and Anderson 1999) .

The world becomes more "flat" due to globalization so as to create what is said to be a "global village". In religious life, there are at least five attitudes of religious adherents towards the presence of globalization that occurs. *First* , it fully supports because it is a direct result of the economic globalization that arises with the existence of a free market through the free market mechanism brought by the IMF, World Bank and International Trade Organization (WTO). *Secondly*, it cannot be rejected because of the communication industry revolution that reaches all levels of society. World information can be accessed through private television channels, CNN, world television networks and the internet. *Third* , globalization is a true dimension of political economy and military so that it is possible for world destruction and violence in the name of religion.

Therefore there must be a critical attitude towards the phenomenon of globalization. *Fourth* , there is a dominance of certain countries over other countries under the pretext of wanting to be a savior of the world or "global police" tasked with protecting the world's environmental security. This creates economic dominance and world religious practice by powerful countries. And *fifth* , the dimensions of religion and culture will co-exist together so that it is difficult to distinguish between religious and cultural dimensions explicitly. This is what has an impact on cultural changes in religion. There is an overlap in religion and culture that takes place in the midst of community religious practices (Stahl 2007, 337-39) .

The study in this paper would like to provide a critical elaboration related to the phenomenon of Islamic symbols and Islamic rituals the frame of popular culture which in the last twenty years has become an inevitable phenomenon in Islamic studies in Indonesia. The approach in this paper uses the approach of sociology and cultural anthropology. With this approach it is expected to illustrate how cultural practices coincide with Islamic rituals so that the two coincide and seem inseparable. The issue of local culture, and global culture is actually a study area which always causes debate because of place and displace factors. The issue of place and displace in cultural studies is often embedded in the study of people's identity of politics.

Related to the popular concept of Islam and its opponents, which is often said to be Islamic scriptural or "Islamic literalist" will be described in the subchapters in this article. The matter of ritual actually rests on regulation or fiqh. While culture is based on habits that exist in the community. Only in practice between ritual and culture in Indonesia often mixed into one. Thus, some Muslims find it difficult to distinguish between what is part of rituals and what is local culture as part of cultural negotiations. Therefore, the emergence of the terms "original culture" and "Islamic authenticity" and "culture hybrid" became difficult to apply strictly in the discussion of the cultural identity of Muslims in Indonesia. Muslims in Indonesia, will be happy to adopt foreign cultural problems from the Middle East or Europe but are unwilling to be called experiencing westernization or Westernization. Indonesian Muslims prefer to be called to adapt to the culture that is said to be "less Islamic" with the Islamic culture that it looks at (Weintraub 2011)

#### **Characteristics**

Indonesian Muslims are actually different from Muslims in Middle Eastern countries though (Azra 2002) . Indonesian Muslims have a moderate, adaptive character and are not confrontational with local culture. This is what makes Indonesian Muslims not choose the path of violence in fighting for their aspirations. Indonesian Muslims prefer peace and political parties to rebellion (Effendy 1998) . Indonesian Muslims also have a strong desire in doing things that are cultural, as a "social glue" in a pluralistic society (MR Woodward 2011) .

The practices of shamanism, trusting occult things (rain handlers), watchers of the southern sea, watchers of large rocks and haunted graves are things that can hardly be abandoned by some Indonesian

Muslims. Specifically Muslims in the Javanese tradition (MR Woodward 1989) Islamic da'wah was even more flexible than the propagation of Islam in the Outer Islands (Daniels 2009). Muslim practices in Java often have a closeness to Javanese traditions, such as *Sumarah*, *Manunggaling kawula lan Gusti* (Stange 2009).

In the latest developments, it turns out that shamanistic practices are often considered "old-fashioned" and out of date, but they continue to occur. In fact, later practice of medicine by calling spirits or spirits; popular with the term *nukyah* become part of the practice that occurs in the world. Even often aired on television and broadcast live. Of course this kind of thing if said to be backward, is rather difficult, but it is said to be advanced also experiencing difficulties because the development of drugs in the medical world has been so advanced. While some Muslims still practice it, in fact, the practice of calling spirits is a habit that also occurs among Javanese people who lost relatives. If the days of the Wali Songo and the early Islamic propagators in Java came from the practice of weighting with shamans and physicians, this time the physician was actually like a doctor who had opened a general practice with modern medicines (MR Woodward 1989).

But what's interesting is the practice back in the early times like physicians is what is now a hobby of some Muslims as "herbal medicine" in addition to special wirid prayers for treatment. The practices of shamanism, the use of accessories, the installation of paintings, drawings and photographs while on the pilgrimage, and the Umrah, in front of the Ka'bah, and the use of ihram clothes installed in the house walls are part of popular Islamic activities. Of course there are also recitation activities in majlis taklim during the holy month of Ramadan in hotels, inviting preachers to the house to open Together with orphans, and handing out gifts during the middle and end of the holy month of Ramadan is inevitable from activities Popular latest Indonesian Islam.

What is unavoidable from the activities of middle-class Muslims who support the rise of Popular Islam is the existence of the media as a means of "mobilizing" and at the same time capitalizing diversity that occurs in society. The true mobilization and commodification of diversity is not only among Muslims, because among Hindus, Buddhists, Jews and Christians also do the same thing (Kitiarsa 2008). Publicity of piety is considered normal, because piety is part of the contestation of public spaces (Hasan 2007). Kitiarsa provided an explanation regarding the religious phenomenon in the Asian region which was allegedly committing commodification in the name of God. However, religious communities in Asia enjoy these conditions as part of religious consumption (Kitiarsa 20 08).

Eickelman and Anderson (1999) describe that in this globalizing world how the role of media has increased but the gate keeper role of nation-states has decreased, and, as a result, more people have gained access to redefining Muslim publics. New and increasingly accessible modes of communication regarding the symbolic language of Islam has facilitated a more fragmented production of texts, generating new and diverse styles of interpretation. New media, new people, and "reintellectualization" (presenting Islamic discourse in accessibility, vernacular terms) of Islam has broad implications for what gets articulated in the public sphere.

#### **Variation**

Indonesian Muslims can be categorized in several variants. If one follows Quintan Wiktorowicz, in *A Genealogy of Radical Islam* (Wiktorowicz 2005), it is said that Muslims in Indonesia fall into several categories for example; symbolic muslim. Symbolic Muslims are often said to be ideological Sharia Muslims (Nashir 2013). In addition, there are salafist Muslims and jihadists (Hasan 2009, 143-66). Salafi-jihadi Muslims are Muslims who are more political in nature so they want the formalization of the basic state to become an Islamic state or Islamic caliphate. In addition there are also Muslim Salafi-Da'wah namely Muslim groups who are developing the traditions of Salafus Salih, which wants to return to the traditions of the Prophet's Companions of the Ancients (Wahid 2014, 51-64). The above terms are actually what are said as Islamism.

In addition to these three variants, Rachmat also mentions the term radical-fundamentalist Muslims who are associated with the political Islamic Movement in the Middle East. Meanwhile there are also Muslim politicians, namely Muslim groups who want to establish an Islamic political party even if they do not set up an Islamic state in Indonesia. (Rachmat 2008). Muhtadi said that Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are parties that seek to negotiate political and sharia interests (Muhtadi 2012). Moeslim Abdurrahman provided an additional group of Muslims referred to as "hybrid Muslims" which is a marriage

of contemporary Muslim groups with polite religious practices and prominent articulation of piety (Abdurrahman 2009).

Carool Kersten, more specifically gives a description that in Indonesia, Islam is divided into modernist-neo-modernist, traditionalist and progressive groups. For Kersten, Indonesian Islam has different characteristics from other countries because the historical and cultural social conditions also influence the style of Islamic thinking and behavior employed by the community. Progressives seem to dominate campus public space and urban Muslims. While traditionalists and even conservatives dominate rural Muslims and Islamic study groups. This is what ultimately led to the growing conflict between the many variants of Indonesian Islam that continued to grow in civil society (Kersten 2015).

The presence of the muslim groups above is a sign that there are various variants that have emerged in Indonesia. But what is most interesting is the presence of hybrid Muslim groups, as stated by Moeslim Abdurrahman. This hybrid Muslim group is a middle-class Muslim group that commonly carries out Umrah with high costs. This cost can only be paid by those middle-class Muslims who have an income above 15 million rupiah monthly.

The hybrid Muslim group is growing in the middle class of Indonesia. These muslims are often represented among artists, celebrities, religious social activists such as Muhammadiyah and NU. But at the same time also among the Islamic study group activists who later spread throughout the archipelago. They are religious social activists who can easily be organized to do almsgroups and other charity works.

#### **Activities**

The activities of Middle Class Moslem Indonesia are plural. Most of these activities are intended for improving piety in their daily lives. They read the Qur'an, carried out tak'lim (Islamic study) with their groups, performed the obligatory rituals and sunnah, performed hajj and umrah to the holy land by taking executive classes. Everything is done as a form of articulation of the piety identity which has become the lifestyle of the Indonesian Muslim middle class. All activities, as Ellen said, are referred to in the Holy Qur'an. Ellen, said:

**2** The popular "in Islam refers to the common everyday activities of people leading a Muslim life as prescribed by the Qur'an. Islam as a "practical" religion refers to "how ordinary people (peasants, proletarians, merchants as well as mystics and scholars) order and articulate categories, symbols and relations between them in the pursuit of comprehending, expressing and formulating social practice and experience " (Ellen 1988, 54).

Islam as "a way of life" encompasses personal, political, economic, and legal dimensions. The above activities show how tightly Islam and popular culture are interwoven into the fabric of everyday life of Muslims in Indonesia. Popular culture has been an integral part of Islamization (also called revival or resurgence). Hefner said since the late 1970s, "mosques have proliferated in towns and villages; religious schools and devotional programs have expanded; a vast market in Islamic books, magazines, and newspapers has developed" (Hefner 1997, 5).

For Hefner, our society today and in the next twenty years will be in the era of "Asia's new capitalism". Asian society will be in complicated and terrible situation when it comes to shopping for consumption of accessories. From shopping about daily food, complementary goods, to the problem of religious accessories become an inseparable part of its life. Asian people, especially Indonesia, cannot be understood if they only rely on the approach of the local political economy. We must understand it in the context of global political economy which is an inseparable part of daily activities as well as religious activities. It is mixed with cultures from Taipei, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, China, Korea and America-Europe. This is the rise of consumption in Asian society. Shopping and religion are two inseparable sides because both have values that can differentiate between one community and another based on those used such as religious accessories and non-religious accessories such as jeans, blue jeans, shoes and branded bags (Hefner 2000, 172-77).

To the same degree, popular Islam also occurs in relation to the matter of the use of accessories such as clothing, headscarves, hijab among women as well as robes, turban, carrying prayer beads, putting the Shahadat sentence on the wall of the house, on the motorbike, hanging the prayer beads on the car, hanging

greetings on the door of the house and the like. They are inseparable parts of the symptomatic phenomenon. This phenomenon of diversity is not only in the Muslim middle class. The most interesting thing is also done by ordinary people or people whose economic life can still be said to be poor in the villages. It can be said that the people also want to identify themselves with the Muslim middle class.

Such religious practices, in Indonesia, are commonly carried out by religious clerics. They always sell religion as part of moral business when people experience turmoil and even disaster. Religious clerics usually hold events on television station programs that are broadcast live and the Islamic public can watch it. A series of *ustadz* (preachers) include: *ustadz* Solmed, Aa Gym, Jefrie al Buchory, Yusuf Manyur, Arifin Ilham, Mamah Dedeh (Fealy and White 2008) .

Such religious behavior increasingly explains that in daily life between the sacred and the profane are difficult to separate. The unclear difference between sacred and profane rises because everything is done in connection with the religious piety "show" (Guire 2007, 61) . In fact, it can actually be read as a way for a person or group to distinguish themselves from others in the practice of daily life (K. Woodward 1997, 1-7) .

We can say the difference in religious practice by a person or community group in more depth as part of the "way of producing identity" based on the events of consuming something and representing the group. The group eventually places itself or is placed by others as a "different group" from others (K. Woodward 1997, 2) . Cultural differences in practice in Islamic societies can actually also be said as a way of peaceful negotiations carried out by the community towards things that are considered sacred and profane (Lukens-Bull 2005) .

In sociology studies, class issues become a deep concern when discussing the issue of "community differences" that exist amidst the presence of cultural and religious diversity. Social class is usually connected with issues of gender justice, one's position among many groups, and something that can be considered as a differentiator from many groups. In the study of classical sociology, class is more directed at the material economic problems. But in the development of post-modern sociology that adheres to the post-structuralist school, social class is more directed to the problems of one's social identity, for example about gender, skin color, and political parties and even one's religion. This is particular but indirectly places a person among many groups (Back 2012, 50-61) .

How social classes are constructed in society cannot be separated from the problem of how the society makes identity as a symbolic and real "differentiator". Differences that emerge are based on things such as claims of the existence of a community's history that is present in the community because of their skin color, language, and history. In addition, social classes are different because they are based on humanitarian institutions which makes them more valued and less respectful. Existing institutions therefore require attention and involvement so as not to make a group of people marginalized and become second class. And third, social classes are different because of massive identity mobilization in society based on political and economic interests, as well as religion as a powerful vehicle (Eisenberg 2009, 9-11) .

The issue of the identity of a person and group can not be seen only on the issue of "skin color", used in everyday life, religious practice, and political choices. All identity issues that are formed will be related to what is called "space and dis-space". There will be a battle between the forming of a new identity with the old identity that is a reference in post-modern society. Postmodern society is a society that is not too busy with material and appearance matters but it is more important to pay attention to whether it is recognized and has space space for expression in the public space (Keith and Pile 1993, 22-40) .

One can understand that the present situation of religious people in Indonesia, especially Muslims who now present themselves as "modern Muslims" . They want to show their piety in public spaces, but they do not want to violate Islamic values. This is a negotiation of space, social class and identity. There is no punishment for groups of people who love to take holy trips to Mecca and Medina to perform Hajj and Umrah. There is also no punishment for those who like to spread the news of Islamic developments, spread *nasyid* songs, and recite modern style prayers, as well as install religious accessories in public spaces. This indicates that the issues of symbol, identity and social class are integral in Indonesian Muslims.

### The Challenge of Muslim Piety

In the context of Popular Islam that is connected with symbolic piety, what actually needs to be presented is a form of Islamic articulation that is more directed towards humanity and justice, not in political Islam. As stated by Nurcholish Madjid, Indonesian Muslims need to develop substantial Islam which humanizes society as a whole.

At present, Muslims are expected to be able to "serve" Islamic values that can shape Indonesia with modern insights. This optimism must be firmly embedded in the vision of building Indonesia's future, reflecting and learning from history, where Islam was once a role model in Indonesia's political history. We must believe in the teachings of goodness that will never change about humanity, because this is something that is in accordance with the ideals of Islam and humanity. Nurcholish Madjid states that the view of the vision of goodness and Indonesian-ness that is applied in Indonesia will be a very good system, not only for Muslims but for Indonesia as a whole (Majdid 1999).

The matter stated by Nurcholish Madjid above gives reinforcement that Indonesian Islam is actually a direction and movement of Islam with modern vision, in accordance with Islamic values that fit with the Prophet Muhammad and the four caliphs. The vision of Indonesian Islam is an Islamic vision of humanity and justice. It is not the vision of a political movement that uses Islam as a political vehicle. Previously, there was a serious threat related to Islamic extremism that comes from within and from outside. It has become a national and international problem. It is related to the strength of mixing Islam with political interest. This problem may emerge from the influence of the internet. "Radicalization, however, is seen as a developmental process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate beliefs towards extreme views" (Smith 2011), where extreme beliefs are those "rejected to a society's core values and principles to mobilization" (Rogers 2008). This process is located in a "context of perceived injustice and alienation from society and the state" (Bhui et al. 2012: 1).

Therefore, radicalization into violent extremism, or violent radicalization, is defined as a process of gradually adopting extreme views and ideas inducing a growing "willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts" (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 798) to solve social and political conflicts. Materializing grievances as a motive for terrorism can also be personal or collective. McCauley and Moskaleiko (2008) found that suicide terrorists are often driven by a sense of personal victimization and revenge. Nevertheless, those personal rationales are "impossible to account for group sacrifice unless the personal [grievance] is framed and interpreted as representative of group grievance" (Ibid., 419). In the context of Salafi-jihadism, those grievances are embedded in the perceived oppression and alienation of Muslims (Brachman 2008, 11). As grievances alone are not sufficient to explain radicalization, some authors postulate the need for a trigger event to link grievances to an enemy (Schmid 2013, 36). Frequently cited as an essential factor in radicalization is the idea of a crisis moment creating the impetus to join an extremist group.

Regarding such conditions, warfare involving ethnicity, religion or ethnicity can actually have a profound impact on them. They are not just "physically injured". But more deeply they experience "inner wounds" which will have an impact on later life behavior. Especially if one does not get channeled in his life. Therefore, radical acts and extremism and terrorism are often the canalization of those who are mentally injured. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Wiktorowicz 2004b, 7) begins his conception of 'joining the cause' with a "cognitive opening," disrupting the "certainty in previously accepted beliefs" and leaving individuals "more receptive" to alternative views. (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 30) NYD model also determines a crisis to function as a catalyst for 'religious seeking' and for (Sageman 2008, 225) a "sense of moral outrage" initiates the radicalization process. These 'activating' events, like witnessing violence that is perceived as unjust, might provoke a strong longing for retribution. As (Silke 2014) has shown, being exposed to such events on the media rather than in the 'real world' appears to be sufficient to create a stimulus to join an extremist organization, if the individual can somehow identify with the victim.

One clearly pays attention that the problem of radicalism-extremism and terrorism is indeed a real problem and must be responded critically. The influence of the massive social media turns out that our world has really changed in many ways, including the problem of radicalism-extremism and terrorism. This problem

is no longer like the 1980s when the world was not yet dominated by the internet and social media.

In this regard, (Sageman 2008, 69) refers to the phenomenon of self-radicalized groups, or 'bunches of guys,' or 'lone wolf pack' terrorism (Pantucci 2011, 24) (Wiktorowicz 2004a, 12, 2005, 115) furthermore, highlights the importance of social networks in "high risk activism" and movement's recruitment efforts through pre-existing kinship and friendship architectures. He also acknowledges the relevance of socialization in terms of gradual indoctrination and identity construction (Wiktorowicz 2004b, 1). Movements, therefore, act as "signifying agent [s]," constructing shared meaning of a collective identity (Flesher Fominaya 2010, 396; Wiktorowicz 2004b, 15). As radical ideas flow through those networks, small clusters of individuals turn to processes of group links, which (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 37) incorporate in their last stage, 'jihadization.'

## Conclusion

The things that have been explained above give a description that there is a Islamization in Indonesia in the last twenty years. In the last four decades, mass-mediated forms of Islam, targeted mostly to urbanized youth, have played a key role in Islamization in Indonesia. This is not to say that people did not have a profound sense of their Islamic identities previously. However, nowadays the connection of Islam and popular culture has grown as called "popular Islam".

The popular Islam has been emerging in Indonesia. It is part of an "emerging Muslim public sphere" that relies on using new media to link Muslims around common interests and Muslim identity politics outside institutions not controlled by nation-states, as Eickelman and Anderson said. Popular Islam in Indonesia can be identified to the growth of Islamic symbols such as headscarves, hijab among women as well as robes, turban, carrying prayer beads, putting the Shahadat sentence on the wall of the house, on the motorbike, hanging the prayer beads on the car, hanging Islamic greetings symbol on the door of the house and the like in public spaces.

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